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AN EMPIRICAL  ASSESSMENT  OF ALTERNATIVE  MODELS 
OF RISKY DECISION  MAKING 
ABSTRACT 
In thia  paper,  we aaaess the degree  to which four of the most commonly 
used models  of risky  decision  making  can explain  the choices  individuals 
make when faced  with risky prospects.  To make this assessment,  we use 
experimental  evidence  for two random  samples  of young  adults.  Using a 
robust,  nonlinear  least squares procedure,  we estimate  a model that is 
general enough  to approximate  Kahnenman  and Tversky's  prospect theory  and 
that for certain  parametric  values  will  yield the expected  utility  model, a 
subjective  expected  utility  model and a probability-transform  model. 
We find that the  four  models  considered  explain  the decision-making 
behavior of the majority  of our subjects.  Surprisingly,  we find that the 
choice  behavior of the largest  number  of subjects  is consistent  with a 
probability-transform  model.  Such  models  have only  been developed  recently 
and  have not been used in applied  settings.  We find least  support  for the 
expected  utility  model - -  the  most  widely  used model of risky decision 
making. 
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Depending  upon one's  viewpoint,  the modelling  of risky  decision  making 
is either  in a state of chaos or fecundity)'  Most applications  of this 
type of decision  modeling continue  to use the expected  utility  approach. 
However, as a result  of persistent  evidence  from laboratory  experiments 
that  people do not make decisions  in the manner suggested  by the expected 
utility  model,  theorists  have developed  a number  of alternative 
representations.  When developing  these  new approaches,  researchers  have 
aought models  that are generally  consistent  with the major findings  of 
laboratory  studies  of choice  behavior  in risky  situations. 
Psychologists  have generally  developed  their theories  inductively 
(e.g.,  Edwards,  1955,  Kahnennian and Tveraky,  1979)  while economists  have 
pursued  deductive  approaches  (e.g., Handa.  1977;  Machina,  1982, Yaari, 
1987).  Thia  work providea a variety of suggested  parametric  forms  for the 
preference  functional. 
To date,  as far as we are aware,  there have been no attempts  to 
eatimate  and compare  the relative  explanatory  power of a number  of 
alternative  models.  In this paper, we begin this  task.  Specifically,  we 
assess  the relative  explanatory  power of four of the major  models  of 
decision  making under  uncertainty  that  have  been proposed.  To do this, we 
uae a functional  form that is general  enough  to approximate  Kahnenman  and 
Tversky'a  prospect theory  model and that for certain  parametric  values  will 
yield  the expected  utility  model,  a subjective  expected  utility  model 
(Savage,  1954;  Edwards, 1955),  and a model  that transforms  probabilities 
but not outcomes (Handa,  1977; Yaari, 1987). 
To summarize  briefly our moat interesting  results,  we find that the 
four models  explain  the decision-making  behavior  of the majority  of our 2 
subjects.  Surprisingly, we find the decision-making behavior of the 
largest number of subjects to be consistent  with  a model in which 
probabilities but not outcomes are transformed.  Such models have been 
developed quite recently and have not been used in applied settings.  We 
find least support for the expected utility model  - -  the  moat widely used 
model of risky decision making. 
Our results suggest that the decision-making model appropriate for 
situations involving potential gains is different from the  model 
appropriate for situations with potential losses.  This is,  of course, a 
major contention of Kahneman and Tversky (1979)  who suggest that the 
outcome transform will be different in the  two settings.  Contrary to 
Kahneman and Tveraky's suggestion,  we find that it is differences in the 
way in which probabilities are  transformed, not differences in the way 
outcomes are  transformed, that usually distinguishes the model for gains 
from the model for losses. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we briefly 
describe the models of risky decision making we consider.  Section III 
presents our empirical model and Sections IV and V  describe the data and 
methods we use to estimate the model.  In Section VI,  we discuss our 
results and the final section contains a summary and our conclusions. 
II.  The Models Considered 
Consider a simple prospect Y  which yields x1 with probability p and 
x2 
with probability (l-p).  Under an expected utility model, the decision 




Note that the decision  maker uses objective  probabilities to weight the 
utility,  u(x.),  of outcomes.  Attitudes  toward  risk are reflected  in the 
shape  of the utility function. 
Since the 1950s some researchers  have been uncomfortable  with this 
model  because they feel that decision  makers  do not use objective 
probabilities,  but rather  develop subjective  probabilities,  s(p),  that are 
used to weight  outcomes.  These subjective  probabilities  are asawned to 
follow  standard  probability  rules, but they  need not be equal  to objecttve 
probabilities.  For example,  Savage  (1954) suggests that the individual 
seeks  to maximize subjective  expected  utility  which is defined  as 
a(p)u(x1) 
+ s(l-p)u(x2). 
Like the expected  utility model this  subjective  expected  utility model 
assumes  that attitudes  toward  risk are reflected  in the utility  function. 
Edwards  (1955) develops a similar  model  but suggests that  attitudes toward 
risk are embedded  in the probability  transform  not in the utility or value 
function. 
More recently a n.unber  of economists  have developed  axiomatic  decision 
models  which embed  risk attitudes in  the probability  transform  and assume 
no transformation  of outcomes.  We refer  to such  models as probability- 
transform  models.  As far as we are aware, Handa (1977) developed the first 
such axiomatic  model.  Under  his model the individual  is assumed to 
maximize 
x1h(p) + x2h(l-p). 4 
The function  h transforms  objective  into subjective  probabilities  and risk 
attitudes  are reflected in the shape  of the probability  transform.  For 
prospects  with more than two outcomes,  Fishburn (1978) has shown that 
Hands's model implies maximization  of expected  returns if violations  of 
stochastic  dominance  are to be avoided. 
Quite recently  Ysari (1987) has developed  a theory dual to the 
expected  utility  model that transforms  probabilities  but not outcomes, 
embeds  risk attitudes  in the probability  transform  and avoids  diffirulties 
with previous  models of this  type  (e.g.,  Hands,  1977;  Quiggina,  1982)L 
Yaari  sees the transform  on probabilities  as indicating  how "perceived  risk 
is processed  into choice"  (p.108).  Note that Yaari's transform  of 
probabilities  is quite different  than  the  transform  proposed in subjertive 
expected  utility models or Hands's  model. 
Kshnemsn and Tversky  (1979) propose an inductively  developed  theory. 
"prospect  theory,"  under  which both probabilities  and outcomes are 
transformed. Under their  model the decision  maker is see as maximizing 
ir(p)v(x1)  ir(l-p)v(x2) 
where v is a value function  which  converts outcomes  to value and  ir  is a 
decision  weighting function  over probabilities.  The value function  is 
defined on deviations  from a reference  point.  Kahneman and Tveraky suggest 
that the value function is concave  above  and convex  below the reference 
point and that the function  is steeper  for losses  than for gains.  The 
decision  weights are not required  to obey the mathematical rules of 
probability. They measure "the impact  of events on the desirability  of the 
prospects and not merely the perceived  likelihood  of these events" S 
(Kahneman  and Tversky, 1979,  p.285).  Conceptually  these decision  weights 
are more like  Yaari's probability  trsnsform  than the probability  transforms 
of the other  models  we have considered.  The decision  weights are assumed 
to have the following  properties: 
1.  subadditivity,  ir(rp)  > rm(p)  for O<r<l, 
2.  subcertainty,  Thr(p.)  C 1  and 
3.  subproportionality,  ir(pr)/r(p) C ir(pqr)/ir(pq)  for O<p,q,r<l 
which implies  that the ratio of the weights of small 
probabilities  is closer  to 1 than those  of large  probabilities. 
In Kahnemsn and Tversky's  model, attitudes  toward  risk are embedded in both 
the value transform  and the decision  weighting  function. 
III.  The Empirical  Model 
Consider the following  model for a two outcome  prospect: 
V(Y)  = f(p)v(x1) 
+ f(l-p)v(x2) 
where V(Y)  is a preference  function  over the risky  prospect,  and v and f, 
respectively,  convert outcomes  and probabilities  into choice relevant 
variables.  As ia traditional,  we value the risky  prospect  by its certainty 
equivalent,  CE,  and assume  that the function  that transforms  outcomes into 
values also transforms  the certainty  equivalent  of a prospect into a 
decision relevant  value,  That is, we assume 
V(Y)  v(CE). 
Assuming that  v is monotonic end continuous,  we obtain 
(1)  CE — v[f(p)v(x1) 
+ f(l-p)v(x2)]. To further  spetify  the model,  we must select  a functional  form for  f 
and  v  that will allow  us to approximate  Kahneman and Tversky's  model and 
that  will for certain parameter  values  yield:  (1) an expected  utility 
model,  (2)  a subjective  expect!d  utility  model, and (3) a model in which 
probabilities  but not outcomes  are transformed. 
We assume that v can be approximated  by a power function,  e.g., 
(2)  v(x) = xl. 
The function  will be concave,  linear  or convex as y <=>  1.  This fora  hoe 
been used extensively  in the literature  and has been found  to provide s 
good fit to  laboratory  data (Fishburn  and Kochenberger,  1979). 
The  four  models  we consider imply  different  interpretations  and values 
for T  The implications  are summarized  in Table 1.  Under an expected 
utility  model (EU) or a subjective  expected  utility model (SEU)  of the  type 
developed  by Savage (1954), one would expect either  y <  1,  implying risk 
aversion,  or 1 > 1 implying  risk-seeking  behavior.  Under these  models a 
value of 1 — 1 would imply risk  neutrality  and thst the  decision  maker 
maximizes  expected  value not expected  utility.  Under a probability- 
transform  model such as that  proposed  by Handa (1977) or Yaari (1987),  one 
would expect  -y  — 1.  Under a prospect theory  model, one would expect that 
C 1 for gains and 
-y  > 1 for losses.  To allow for this possibility,  we 
estimate separate  models for gains  and losses.3 
For the function  that transforms  probabilities,  we select  a form that 
allows a continuous  approximation  to Kahneman and Tversky's  decision 
weighting function: 7 
(3)  f(p)  ap 
+ (1-p) 
The properties  of f depend  upon the values of a and , particularly  upon 
whether these parameters  are less  than,  equal  to or greater than 1.  If 
a < 1  and $ <  1,  the function is aubadditive,  subcertain  and 
subproportional  as posited  by Kahneman  and Tversky for their  decision 
weights.  The form implied  by these parametric  values is depicted  in panel 
a of Figure 1. 
Neither Handa (1977)  not Yaari  (1987) present a specific form for 
their probability transform.  However,  Handa does provide us with a picture 
(1977, Figure 1,  p.  113) which suggests  that  a form like that in panel a 
would  be appropriate. 
Subjective  expected  utility  models imply  that f  is symmetric  around 
0.5 and that people  generally  overweight  probabilities  below .5 and 
underweight  probabilities  above  that value.  Further,  subjective  expected 
utility models  are certain  not subcertain.  Our function  will have the 
characteristics  assumed  by subjective  expected  utility  models if a =1 and 
C  1 as shown in panel  b of Figure 
Finally, the expected  utility model  assumes no transformation  of 
probabilities.  This implies  that  a = $  =  1.  See panel  c of Figure 1. 
To obtain  our empirical  model,  we substitute  equations  (2) and (3) 
into equation (1) and add a stochastic  error term to reflect  such things as 
measurement  and judgement  error.  This  yields: 
CE —  ap  a(l-p)  x1  +  c 
+  (l-p)  + a(l-p 8 
which we estimate  separstely  for gains  and losses. 
If we find that  a <  1 and $ <  I for both gains  and losses and that  -y  C 
1  for  gsins and  -y  > 1  for  losses,  our  work will support a prospect theory 
model.  If,  instead,  we find the above  parameter  values for a and $,  but 
that  -y  — 1  for  both gains  and losses than  a probability-transform  model 
would seem more appropriate.  Our results  will support  a subjective 
expected  utility  model if a  1,  $ < I and  — 1  and s expected  utility 
model if a — $  =  1  and  1. 
IV.  The Data 
Our data  were obtained from two groups  of young adult  North 
Carolinians. The first group  of 47 was selected  at random from the 
undergraduate  student  body at the University  of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill.  These  students  were part of a computer  administered  panel study and, 
thus,  were familiar  with the type of interattive  computer program that  we 
use  to sdminister  the decision-making  scenarios.  Students are the most 
commonly  used subjects for laboratory  experiments. 
To broaden  the socioeconomic  representstion  of participants,  we 
selected a second  group  of 23 subjects  at random  from a set of 
incarcerated,  young (18-22) male property offenders.  These offenders  had 
been randomly  assigned to participate  in an innovative  job training/ 
reintegration  program. 
Each group  was presented  with two types  of risky decisions.  The first 
was a set of standard  money gambles  (over  gains  and losses)  of the kind 
generally  used in this type of laboratory  experiment.  The second involved 
a criminal  choice (gain)  scenario  and a plea  bargain (loss)  scenario. 
Responses to the latter  type of decisions  appeared to be subject to fewer 9 
attention  lapses  and judgement  errors,  perhaps because the scenarios 
appeared  more concrete.  We present results only for the second  type of 
risky  decisions although  our general conclusion  would  be similar  if we used 
data for the  standard  money gambles. 
Because the amount  of time  with students  was limited,  we developed  an 
interactive  computer  program that contained  instructions  and presented the 
decision-making  scenarios.  Students  were paid for their  participation  in 
the study. 
We provided the offenders  in our study  with verbal instructions  and 
a set of "practice"  risky  decisions  on the computer  because  of their  lqver 
level  of education  and lack  of experience  with interactive  computer 
programs.  Their responses  to the practice decisions  were observed. 
Misunderstandings  were cleared  up and questions  answered.  The offenders 
were then presented  with scenarios  by the same interactive  computer  progrsis 
ss used  with the  students. 
To obtain  certsinty  equivalents  (CEs)  for gains  we presented  subjects 
with scenarios  like  the following: 
Suppose that you had decided  to break into  one of two markets -- 
Jack's  or Harry's.  Further,  suppose  that  you knew that it would take 
the same skill  to break into either  market  and that the risk of 
capture  waa the same.  Further,  suppose that  you know that  Jack has 
$900 in his register  half of the time and $100 the other  half,  while 
Harry always  has some cash in his register. 
The options available  to the  subject  were then  presented in tabular  form 
and the  subject  was asked "what is the smallest  number  of dollars there 
would have to be in Harry's register  before  you would choose  to break into 
Harry's rather than Jack's?".  This is the certainty  equivalent  value we 
use when estimating  our model.5 10 
The possible  cash amounts  in Jack's register (x1 
and  in our model) 
ranged from $0 to $1000.  The values  of p considered  were from 0.01 to 
0.99. 
The loss scenarios  were presented  in a similar  fashion.  Subjects  were 
asked  to choose  between a certain sentence  agreed  to in a plea bargain and 
the risky  prospect of going to trial.  Possible trial  outcomes (x1 
and x,) 
C 
were  sentences  ranging  from  0  to 36 months.  Values for probabilities  were 
the same as for the illegal-gains  scenario,  Subjects  were asked to 
indicate  the longest sentence  length  they  would accept in  a plea bargain in 
order to forego  a trial  (the  risky  prospect). 
To prevent  the order of presentation  of prospects from affecting 
response7,  scenario  selection  was  random  for both the gain and loss 
settings.  Further,  subjects  were equally  likely  to be presented with the 
gain or loss  scenarios  first.  To prevent some  meaningless  responses,  the 
subjects  were instructed  to choose  a certainty  equivalent  value between the 
two values  for the risky  prospect (a value  between  and 
x2) 
.  If a 
subject  choose  a vslue outside  this range,  they  were again instructed  to 
choose  s value within  the range.  This iterstive  procedure continued  until 
the subject  chose  s value  between  and 
x2. 
Inmates  provided  certainty  equivalents  for  34 gain and 34 loss 
scenarios.  Due to the limitation  on student  time noted above, students 
provided responses  to only 29 gain  and 29 loss scenarios.  Thus,  student 
models are estimated  with 29 data  points  and inmate  models with 34. 
V.  Method  of Estimation 
We use an iteratively  reweighted  nonlinesr  least squares technique  to 
estimate our model.  This procedure is robust  to outliers  because it gives 11 
less weight to such observations  than  would a standard  least squares 
procedure.  The method of reweighting  observations  is due  to Beaton  and 
Tukey (1974)  .  We  feel it is desirable  to downweight  outlying observations 
because for the type of data we are using  such observations generally  occur 
due to fatigue and attention  lapses.  Nonlinear  least squares parameter 
estimates  were obtained  by a numerical  procedure due  to Ralston and 
Jennrich (1978) 
VI.  Results 
We estimated  our decision-making  models (gain  and loss  models) for 57 
of the 70 students selected for the study.  We were unable to use the data 
for  13 of our 70 subjects  because of unreasonable  responses (e.g.  ,  same 
response to all scenarios)  or a failure  of the parameter  estimates to 
8 
converge. 
In general our model fit the decision  data for our subjects  quite 
well.  The R2s  for the model ranged  from 0.21 to 0.99 for the gain 
scenarios  with R2s above 0.50 for eighty-two  percent of the subjects.  For 
the loss scenarios,  the R2s were from  0.13 to 0.98 with R2s  above  0.5  for 
eighty-eight  percent of the subjects. 
A.  The Outcome and Probability  Transforms  for Gains 
Consider first  the results  for the function  that transforms  outcomes, 
v  x1.  For the majority of subjects,  over sixty  percent (34 of the 57) 
we cannot  reject9 the null hypothesis that -y—l.  These results would  be 
consistent  with either an expected  value or probability-transform  model. 
For the bulk of the remaining  subjects,  thirty  percent, our results 
indicate  that y is significantly  less than 1.  This implies that  for these 12 
subjects  the gains  function is concave  which would  be consistent  with so 
expected  utility,  subjective  expected  utility or prospect theory  model. 
For the remaining  nine percent of the subjects,  our results indicste that  y 
is significantly  greater than one.  This is not generally expected  for any 
of the models  considered,  but under  sn expected  utility or subjective 
expected  utility  model,  this  result  could  be interpreted  as indicating  risk 
seeking  behavior for this minority  group  of subjects. 
Turning next to the function that trsnsforms  probabilities,  our 
results indicate  that  almost  half (46 percent) of the subjects transform 
probabilities  in the manner  suggested  by the subjective  expected  utility 
model.  Specifically,  for  these  subjects,  we cannot  reject the null 
hypothesis  that a = 1  and find  support  for the alternative  hypothesis that 
a C 1.  See penel b of Figure 1.  For nineteen  percent of the subjects (11 
subjects)  test statistics  support  the contention  thst  a C 1 end 
fi  C  1. 
These  psrsmeter  values indicate  that  probabilities  are  transformed  as 
indicsted  by prospect theory.  See panel s of Figure  1.  For sixteen 
percent of the subjects (9 subjects),  results indicate thst there is no 
trsnsformstion  of probabilities (i.e.,  a =  1).  These results  sre 
consistent  with either  an expected  utility  or an expected  value model. 
For the remaining  nineteen  percent of our subjects (11 subjects)  ,  the 
shape  of the probability  transform  implied by our results  were not 
consistent  with any of the models considered.  For four of these subjects 
the test statistics  support the contention  that  a < 1 and  fi 
—  1.  The shape 
of the probability  transform  implied  by these  parametric  values is depicted 
in panel a of Figure  2.  As can be clearly  seen,  these  subjects underweight 
all probabilities. Under Handa's  model  these  subjects  would be seen as 13 
globally  riak averse  and under  Yaari's  as behaving Ilpessimistically.TT  For 
another six of these  nonconforming  subjects,  results  indicate  that  o > 1 
and  c 1.  See panel  b of Figure  2.  Theae subjects  overweight  all but 
high probabilities.  The probability  transform  is supracertain  (i.e.,  f(p) 
> 1) which is not suggeated  by any of the models  we consider.  Finally, for 
one subject,  a probability  transform  like that in panel  c of Figure 2 is 
suggested.  Comparing thia  ahape  with the shape implied  by the subjective 
expected utility  model  (panel  b of Figure  1)  ,  the  reader  will note that 
this  is the mirror isage  of the form suggested  by that model.  This subject 
underweighta  probabilities  below 0.5  and overweights  probabilities  above 
0.5. 
3.  The Outcome and Probability  Transforms  for Losses 
For losses,  we find that sixty-nine  percent of our subjects  do not 
tranaforma  outcomes,  i.e., we cannot  reject  the null hypothesis  that i 
For both the gains  and loss  scenarios,  our results  for the Outcome 
transform  are most in accord  with a probability-transform  or expected value 
model.  For sixteen of the remaining  eighteen  subjects,  our results 
indicate  risk-seeking  behavior.  This outcome is predicted  by prospect 
theory.  For the  two remaining  subject test statistics  indicated  risk 
aversion  over losses. 
Turning to results  for the function  that transforms  probabilities,  we 
find that for losses  the probability  transform  is as suggested  by prospect 
theory  for 42 percent (24 subjects)  of our subjects.  For these subjects, 
the probability  transform  is subadditive  for small  probabilities, 
subcertain  and subproportional  and subjects  overweight  low probabilities 
and underweight  high ones.  See panel  a of Figure 1.  A  probability 14 
transform  of the type suggested  by subjective  expected  utility is supported 
for 26 percent of our subjects.  See panel b of Figure 1.  For sixteen 
percent of our subjects,  results  suggest  no transform  of probabilities as 
posited  by expected  utility  and expected  value  models. 
As was found  for the gains scenarios,  the probability  transform  for a 
minority of subjects (9 subjects)  is not suggested  by any of the models 
considered.  Results for five of these  subjects  indicate  an overweighting 
of all but high probabilities.  See panel  b of Figure 2.  Results for two 
subjects are as depicted  in panel a of Figure  2 and results for one  as 
depicted in panel c.  Finally,  one subject  overweighted  all probabilities 
for the loss scenarios. 
C.  Implications  for the Decision-Makina  Model 
Table 2 summarizes  our empirical  results as they relate  to the 
decision-making  models  we consider.  The first thing to note about these 
results  is that the four types  of decision-making  models  we consider 
account  for the behavior  of the majority  of the  individuals  we study. 
Specifically,  for situations  offering  possible gains,  these  models beat 
describe  the behavior  of 70 percent  of the subjects  and for situations 
involving  losses  almost  75 percent of our subjects.  Considering  the 
diverse  backgrounds  of the individual  in our study this  provides 
encouraging  support  for the  inaightfulness  of theorists. 
It is interesting  that approximately  10 percent of our subjects appear 
to simply  maximize expected  value in both gain  and loss settings.  Another 
10 percent  of the subjects  tend to rather  pervasively  overweight 
probabilities. 15 
Comparing  the relative  performance  of the four  models we find that a 
probability-transform  model, a model that transforms  probabilities  but not 
outcomes,  describes  the decision-making  behavior of the  largest  number  of 
subjects.  This model  well represents  the behavior of 42 percent of all 
subjects  when facing gains  and 51 percent  of all subjects  when facing 
losses.  For gains  scenarios,  the subjective  expected  utility  model is 
appropriate  for the next largest  number  of subjects (16 percent) and for 
loss scenarios,  a prospect  theory  model  (14 percent).  It is interesting 
that  the expected  utility  model appear  to describe  the behavior of only 5 
percent of our subjects. 
VII.  Conclusions 
We believe that our work makes  both a methodological  and substantive 
contribution.  From a methodological  perspective,  we have developed  and 
implemented  a procedure that allows  researchers  to more systematically  use 
laboratory  evidence to evaluate  alternative  models  of risky  decision 
making.  To date,  both economists  and psychologists  have generally 
marshalled  laboratory  evidence,  on samples  of convenience,  to assess  or 
develop a single  model of risky  decision  making.  To be more specific, 
laboratory  data are generally  obtained  from readily available  subjects  such 
as college undergraduate  volunteers  or students in particular  classes.  The 
patterns observed  in these  data are then  used either  to infer a model 
(e.g.  ,  Kahnenman  and  Tversky,  1979)  or to corroborate  a deductively 
developed  model (e.g.,  Handa,  1977; Yaari, 1987).  Corroboration  is not 
generally  obtained through  the use of standard  statistical  procedures  or 
standard  statistical  tests.  The relative  explanatory  power of alternative 
models is not generally  considered. 16 
We obtain our laboratory  data from random  samples of  subjects,  uae a 
mathematical  form that encompasses  a number  of the most commonly  used 
models  of risky  decision  making and assess  the relative  merits of the 
alternative  models using  scandard statistical  tests.  More specifically, 
our dats are for a group that is representative  of the undergraduate 
population  of a large  state  university  and a group representative  of the 
young,  male property  offenders.  While these  samples  are certainly  not 
ideal, they are  representative  of identifiable  populations  and come from a 
broader  range  of socioeconomic  backgrounds  than has usually been the  case. 
The mathematical  form we use will,  under  various parametric  restrictions, 
yield a prospect  theory,  a subjective  expected  utility, a probability 
transform  and an expected  utility  model.  We estimate the parameters  of 
this model using a robust,  nonlinear  least squares  procedure  and use 
standard  statistical  tests  to distinguish  among the alternative  models. 
Substantively,  we provide rather  surprising  evidence  regarding the 
relative  explanatory  power of the four models  considered.  Comfortingly,  ac 
find that the four models  considered  explain  the decision-making  behavior 
of the majority (seventy  to seventy  five percent) of our subjects. 
Surprisingly,  our results  provide  most support  for a probability-transform 
model.  Under this  type of model,  risk attitudes  are reflected  in the 
function  that transforms  probabilities  and outcomes  are not transformed. 
Such models  have been developed  quite  recently (e.g., Handa, 1977;  Yaeri, 
1987)  and have not,  as far as we are aware, been used in applied  settings. 
However,  Yasri ties such models to more widely  used models  by showing that 
there  is a probability  transform  model dual to the expected  utility model. 
It is interesting  that of the four models  we consider,  we find least 17 
support  for  the expected  utility  model -  -  the  most  widely used model of 
risky decision  making. 
Turning to insights  for future  modelling  efforts,  our results indicate 
that the decision-making  model appropriate  for situations  involving 
potential gains  is different  from the model  appropriate  for settings 
involving  potential  losses.  This is, of course,  a major contention  of 
Kshneman and Tversky (1979) who suggest  that the outcome transform  will be 
different  in the two settings.  However,  we do not find that it is the 
outcome transform  that is different  in the two settings.  Recall that the 
majority  of our aubjecta  do not appear  to transform  outcomes.  Our results 
suggest that the major  difference in decision  making for gain and loss 
settings results  from differences  in the way in which  probabilities  are 
transformed. Hands (1977) discusses  this possibility.  For gains,  the most 
common form for the probability  transform  is that suggested  by the 
subjective  expected  utility  model.  This transform  indicates  that people 
overweight  probabilities  below .5 and underweight  probabilities  below .5. 
See panel a of Figure  1.  In loss  setting,  the most common transform  is 
that suggeated  by prospect theory.  With such a transform,  people 
overweight  a narrower  range of low probabilities  and underweight  a wider 
range of high probabilities.  See panel  b of Figure  1. 18 
Notes 
1.  For surveys of the litersture,  see Schoemaker (1982), Sugden (1986) or 
Machins (1987). 
2.  In both Quiggins'  (1982) snd Yasri's model the transform  is not over 
the simple  probability  of an outcome  but rather  over all (Quiggins)  or part 
of the  distribution  (Yaari,  1987). 
3.  Work by Kahnenman  and Tversky (1979) and Fishburn  and Kochenberger 
(1979)  suggests  that the reference  point is near the current asset level 
and,  thus,  separate  assessments  over gains  and losses  should  capture this 
aspect  of  Kshneninan and Tversky's  model for the young adult  subjects  we 
use.  We treat losses  as positive  numbers as we must if we are  to use this 
outcome  transform.  This,  of course,  means  that  under an expected  utility 
or subjective  expected  utility  model,  risk  aversion is implied  by convexity 
and risk-seeking  behavior  by concavity  when the model is estimated  for 
losses. 
4.  Additionally,  it should  be noted that equation (3) with  = 1  is 
identical  to the decision  weighting  function  suggested  by Karmarksr (1978) 
for his subjectively  weighted  utility  model.  Ksrmsrkar suggested  that 
k\7(xk) 
m 
v(CE) —  ,  where 
wk 
p  . For  prospects involving  more 
k  p  +(l—p) 
thsn two 
oucomes, 
our decision  weighting function  would be 
— 
apk jlj 
5.  The careful reader  will note thst this  is only a very close 
approximation  to s true certainty  equivslent.  However, this  method of 
presentation greatly  simplified  the subjects'  task and increased  their 
understanding  of the decision  making  problem. Given  rounding this 
"threshold  equivalent"  should  be virtually  identical  to the certainty 
equivalent. 19 
6.  These sentence lengths  are reasonable  under North Carolina  statutes. 
See Clarke and Rubinsky (1981). 
7.  See Tversky and Kahneman (1982)  for a discussion. 
8.  For gain scenarios  seven subjects  provided  unreasonable  responses  and 
parameter estimates  for six subjects failed  to converge.  For loss 
scenarios,  eleven  subjects  provided unreasonable  responses  and parameter 
estimates for two subjects failed  to converge. 
9.  Unless otherwise  noted all two-tailed  tests  of significance  are at the 
a  .05 level  and all one-tailed  tests  at the a —  .025  level. 20 
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)Table  1 




of  the  Expected  Utility! 
Outcome  Subjective  Expected  Probability  Prospect 
Value  of 
-y  Transform  Utility (Savage) model  Transform  Theory 
y <  1  Concave  Risk  Aversion  Assumed 
Ovet Gains 
=  1  Linear  Risk 
(Expecte 
Neutrality 
d  Value  Mcdel) 
Assumed 
Linear 
-y  >  1  Convex  Risk  Seeking  Assumed 
Over Losses Table 2 
Implications  for the Decision-Making  Models 
Percent of Subjects,  Percent of Subjects, 
Model  Gains  Losses 
Ebplicitlv considered 
Expected  Value  10.5  10.5 
Expected  Utility  5.3  0.0 
(risk  avereion) 
Expected  Utility  0.0  5.3 
(risk  seeking) 
Subjective  Expected  Utility  10.5  0.0 
(risk  aversion) 
Subjective  Expected  Utility  5.3  3.5 
(risk  seeking) 
Probability  Transform  29.8  22.8 
(S  EU-type) 
Probability  Transform  12.3  28.1 
(PT-cype) 
Prospect Theory (PT)  7.0  1.8 
(concave  value function) 
Prospect Theory  0.0  123m 
(convex  value function) 
"Aberrent" 
Supracertain  10.5  10.5 
Always  Underweight  7.0  3.5 
Probabilities 
Mirror Subjective Expected  1.8  1.8 
Utility 
aSince  we treated losses  as positive  numbers for purposes of 
estimation,  an estimated concave function (p<l)  equates to a convex 
function in the  loss domain (negative  quadrant) and am estimated convex 
function to a concave one.  For the purposes of this table,  we have 
classified  results as they  would be if the function were estimated in the 
loss domain. 